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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: O'Keefe, Joel Facility: Auburn CF 









Cheryl Kates, Esq. 
P.O. Box 734 
Fairport, New York 14450 
December 5, ~018 revocation of release and imposition of a time assessment of 17 
months. 
November 27, 2018 
Appellant's Brief received September 3, 2019 
Statement of the Appeals Unit'.s Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Notice of Violation, Violation of Release Report, Final Hearing Transcript, Parole 
Revocation Decision Notice 
_ Vacated for de no.vo review of time assess~ent only Modified to 
---~ 
_ Rev~rsed, remanded for de novonearing _ Reversed, violation vacated 
. . . 
_ Vacated for .de novo review of time assessment only Modified to ___ _ 
-~. 
_ Affirmed _ Reversed, remanded for de novo hearing Reversed, violation vacated - . . 
Commissioner · · _.·_vacated for de novo review of tim.e assessment only Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recomme~dation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. · -..--
This Final Determination, the.related.Statemeµt of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findin s of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the inmate's Counsel, if any, on .J J.O().O 4.Jt . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - In.st. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/20 i 8) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: O'Keefe, Joel DIN: 95-A-1020 
Facility: Auburn CF AC No.:  01-123-19 R 
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Appellant is serving an aggregate sentence of fourteen years, six months to 29 years upon 
his conviction of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the third degree, Burglary in the First 
Degree, Escape in the first degree, Promoting Prison Contraband in the first degree, and two counts 
of Attempted Escape in the first degree.  He was released to parole supervision in March 2018.  In 
October 2018, he was charged with violating conditions of parole by, among other things, giving 
a card to a woman seeking a sexual encounter after being directed not to do so and failing to notify 
his parole officer that he had contact with police.  Thereafter, Appellant’s parole was revoked upon 
his unconditional plea of guilty to two violations (Rule 13 and 6) and eight remaining charges were 
withdrawn.  The Department recommended a 20-month time assessment while counsel advocated for 
less.  The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) – who initially had indicated she would offer 18 – 
imposed a 17-month time assessment.  This appeal ensued. 
  
Appellant challenges the December 5, 2018 determination of the ALJ on the following 
grounds: (1) Appellant’s plea is invalid; (2) new evidence shows he attempted to contact his parole 
officer and there is insufficient evidence to sustain other charges; (3) the time assessment is 
excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment; (4) Appellant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel; (5) DOCCS failed to adequately investigate to determine his intent in handing out cards; 
(6) the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient; (7) the ALJ was biased and failed to 
conduct the hearing in a lawful manner; (8) Appellant’s discretionary sex offender designation 
violates his guilty plea in the underlying criminal case, renders it invalid and violates Equal 
Protection, Due Process, Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto and the Eighth Amendment;                             
(9) Appellant’s parole conditions violate the First Amendment right of free association;                 
(10) Appellant was denied reasonable accommodations in regard to  in violation of 
the ADA; and (11) DOCCS improperly denied Appellant records requested for this appeal. 
Appellant seeks to be revoked and restored to parole without a discretionary sex offender 
categorization or, alternatively, granted a new hearing. 
 
Appellant’s parole was revoked at the hearing upon his unconditional plea of guilty.  
Appellant was represented by counsel at the final hearing, and the ALJ explained the substance of the 
plea agreement.  Appellant confirmed that was how he wished to proceed and there is nothing to 
indicate he was confused or coerced.  Nothing in the Executive Law requires a detailed plea 
allocution.  The guilty plea was entered into knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, and is therefore 
valid.  Matter of Steele v. New York State Div. of Parole, 123 A.D.3d 1170, 998 N.Y.S.2d 244 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Matter of James v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 106 A.D.3d 1300, 965 
N.Y.S.2d 235 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Ramos v. New York State Div. of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 852, 
853, 752 N.Y.S.2d 159 (3d Dept. 2002).   
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Appellant’s guilty plea establishes that he violated parole in an important respect and 
precludes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.  See Matter of Harris vounse. Evans, 121 
A.D.3d 1151, 993 N.Y.S.2d 790 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Steele, 123 A.D.3d 1170, 998 N.Y.S.2d 
244; Matter of Taylor v. NYS Division of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 953, 968 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d 
Dept. 2013); Matter of Holdip v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d 825, 779 N.Y.S.2d 382 (4th Dept. 2004); Matter 
of Fuller v. Goord, 299 A.D.2d 849, 849, 749 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (4th Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 100 
N.Y.2d 531, 761 N.Y.S.2d 592 (2003).  We nonetheless note a parole condition can be verbal and 
Appellant admits on appeal that he engaged in conduct giving rise to the Rule 13 violation.  
Conduct which is less than criminal conduct may result in a revocation of parole where such 
conduct is proscribed by the conditions of parole.  People ex rel. Walker v. Hammock, 78 A.D.2d 
369, 435 N.Y.S.2d 410 (4th Dept. 1981).  Claims concerning withdrawn charges are moot.  See 
generally Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 713-14, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (1980).  And 
while asserting he attempted to contact his parole officer, Appellant does not dispute the revocation. 
 
Appellant argues he must be revoked and restored to parole.  However, the ALJ acted within 
her discretion to impose a 17-month time assessment pursuant to 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8005.20(c)(1).  The 
Executive Law does not place an outer limit on the length of time that may be imposed.  Matter of 
Washington v. Annucci, 144 A.D.3d 1541, 41 N.Y.S.3d 808 (4th Dept. 2016); Matter of Wilson 
v. Evans, 104 A.D.3d 1190, 1191, 960 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (4th Dept. 2013).  The time assessment 
was not excessive in view of Appellant’s serious criminal history and the nature of the sustained 
Rule 13 violation alone.  See, e.g., Matter of Lafferty v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1628, 50 N.Y.S.3d 
221 (4th Dept. 2017); D.L. Riley v. Alexander, 139 A.D.3d 1206, 1207, 31 N.Y.S.3d 318, 320 (3d 
Dept. 2016); Matter of Murchison v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 91 A.D.3d 1005, 1005, 935 
N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (3d Dept. 2012).  It also does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.  
See Gill v. Stella, 845 F. Supp. 94, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 
Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is foreclosed by his guilty 
plea.  People v. Bethany, 182 A.D.2d 1084, 882 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (4th Dept. 1992).  “There is 
no showing that counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness infected the plea bargaining process, that 
[Appellant] entered a plea because of his attorney’s poor performance, or that [his] guilty plea was 
not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.”  Id. (citations omitted).  In any event, counsel “is 
presumed to have been competent and the burden is on the [appellant] to demonstrate upon the 
record the absence of meaningful adversarial representation.”  Matter of Jeffrey V., 82 N.Y.2d 
121, 126, 603 N.Y.S.2d 800, 803 (1993); see also People v. Hall, 224 A.D.2d 710, 638 N.Y.S.2d 
732 (2d Dept. 1996) (“When, as in this case, a defendant receives an advantageous plea agreement 
and the record does not cast doubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel, the defendant is 
deemed to have been furnished with meaningful representation”).  Appellant’s claim is without 
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merit “as the record discloses that he received meaningful representation.”  Matter of James, 106 
A.D.3d at 1300-1301, 965 N.Y.S.2d at 237; accord Matter of Partee v. Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 1294, 
74 N.Y.S.3d 114 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Rosa v. Fischer, 108 A.D.3d 1227, 969 N.Y.S.2d 706 
(4th Dept.), lv. denied, 22 N.Y.3d 855, 979 N.Y.S.2d 561 (2013); see also Matter of Bond v. 
Stanford, 171 A.D.3d 1320, 97 N.Y.S.3d 807 (3d Dept. 2019). 
 
Appellant complains that DOCCS thwarted record requests submitted for the purposes of 
his appeal by failing to respond.  However, the record reflects DOCCS released some records and 
the requests otherwise were denied.  We also note Appellant’s claim would not provide a basis to 
disturb the ALJ’s earlier determination rendered upon Appellant’s valid plea of guilty. 
 
Appellant’s remaining challenges are foreclosed by his plea of guilty.  In addition, his 
objections were not raised and therefore were waived.  See, e.g., Matter of Davis v. Laclair, 165 
A.D.3d 1367, 1368, 85 N.Y.S.3d 623 (3d Dept. 2018); People ex rel. Murray v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 95 A.D.3d 1527, 944 N.Y.S.2d 403 (3d Dept. 2012).  His First Amendment challenge 
to withdrawn charges is moot.  See generally Hearst Corp., 50 N.Y.2d at 713-14, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 
402.  And his objections to his discretionary sex offender designation are beyond the scope of the 
Board’s jurisdiction, as is any challenge to his underlying criminal conviction.  9 NYCRR § 
8006.3; id. §§ 8006 et seq. 
  
We nonetheless note there is no support in the record for Appellant’s claim that the 
administrative law judge was biased against him.  Matter of Hampton v. Kirkpatrick, 82 A.D.3d 
1639, 919 N.Y.S.2d 422 (4th Dept. 2011); People ex rel. Brazeau v. McLaughlin, 233 A.D.2d 724, 
725, 650 N.Y.S.2d 361 (3d Dept. 1996), lv. denied, 89 N.Y.2d 810, 656 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1997).  
Appellant’s assertion that the ALJ applied the incorrect “standard of review” is without merit.  
Appellant’s plea of guilty establishes the violation.  There is no requirement of a detailed plea 
allocation.  Moreover, Appellant had the opportunity to raise mitigating evidence during off-the-
record plea discussions. 
    
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
